

Ann Cotten

Un ga aru:
Sound
Symbolism,
International
Puns and
Contingency

1. What are puns, and what is their role in psychoanalysis?

Freud has detected puns in dreams also; so what are they doing? The attempt to answer takes us down the pleasure quarters street above whose arcades flutters a faded awning labeled »Sound Symbolism«. If one starts to talk about puns, it is important to clarify what kind of thing one considers them to be. I must also state briefly what I consider psychoanalysis to be doing. Regarding them together acts upon their intuited similarity, but rather than amplifying meanings read into puns, I will be going the other direction: taking meaning out of psychoanalysis. Because the meaninglessness of sound symbolism, like any kind of symbolism, is essential to its function as symbol (not index or icon), arbitrariness is strictly observed by communities of users trying to be sane. That is why poetry and dreams are assigned a special magic playground and made taboo in the daytime world. One can see how Lacan's structuralist focus on psychoanalytic grammar makes it more reuseable in changed cultural contexts. Kuki Shûzô's observations on puns and contingency as an aesthetic effect help to consider how we use sound similarity for meaning making, even if his thoughts concerning old philosophical questions of the relation of necessity and contingency remain open-ended.

2. Helpful shades

It has been asked, notably by Lacan, whether or not the Japanese are in need of psychoanalysis, or are already supplied with something that fulfills an analogue function. The depths of meaning contained in the Sinojapanese writing system make Greek mythology look pale as a source of imagery for organizing feelings. One might rather compare it with the combinatoric depths of Kabbala alphabet handling. But sticking with mythology *sensu strictu*, Kosawa Heisaku had once proposed to Freud a setup called the Ajase complex after prince Ajase, a case of matricide in Japanese mythology, which, rather than the tragic fulfillment of the Oedipus saga, ends with the characters maturing and accepting ambiguity in their relations.¹

Instead of looking for resources in tradition, one could also look into the service of refreshing and reshuffling archetypes and associations provided by new sets of meaning. After all, in foreign contexts, and to an extent even in Vienna, the effect of Freudian narratives is one of novelty and healthy alienation, the insight-generating Brechtian V-Effekt, regardless of the question of unearthing eternal or archetypal truths. In its questioning of the perversions of the family and with the goal of practical individual functioning, it even turns into in a kind of anti-genealogical reasoning.

Where *Tiefenpsychologie* delves into what one might call deep familiarity, a new language offers an as yet unexplored connectivity. Docking on to a person's network of meaning and imagery with new images offers new emphases and perspectives, rearranges alignments. If this is an established school of thought, I have missed it; one might call it *Untiefenpsychologie*. Here »un« could be read with the opposing meanings found in *Untiefen*, which originally meant »dangerous shallows« (un-depths), but among people innocent of navigation has successively strengthened the meaning of »unfathomable depths«. The *Un-* in *Unmengen*, *ungeheuer*, *unfassbar* etc. which designates ineffably huge amounts, seems to be generically associated with murky shadows and unfathomable depths of negativity.

Structuralism with synchronic focus has indeed been reproached for shallowness. But are not dreams and other forms of surfacing also like a tray or a beach, *the wrong* environment: a museum? Such a function of shallows is also performed by travel, where one's network of meaning is cut off and one can walk down the street as a relationless nobody with an observer's gaze, for a while. Not only does the cutoff allow respite from the sensemaking and the habitual patterns. It is also a space from which new connections can be found and cultivated. Sense is something humans make, rather than have – German grammarians disliking the anglicism *Sinn machen* must return not to *Sinn haben* but to *Sinn ergeben*, a non-subjective version, humble and ergonomic rather than creative.²

As Kuki Shûzô said, »a geographically distant journey is like a sudden attack on the journey of a life – from time to time a

little pun is very comforting.«³ Chances for randomness are raised when people leave the causal network their lives are embedded in. Each chance meeting unfolds its consequences, between people and between words, but there may be more or less space for this in between existing networks. Here, the Buddhist philosophical tradition never ceases to emphasize that the endlessly myriad, interconnected nodes of being do not get in each other's way. These myriad infinities are unproblematic, space-wise, because the universe is not conceptualized by a container metaphor.

Fresh sense-making can be shared through skilled renderings and enthusiastic reception, in text, poetry or essay. Many poetics have stressed the value of the new, as complimentary force to value drawn from connectivity with the old. It is not new material, it is just new connections; an augmentation or re-actualization, re-organization of our internalized semantic network. With a pun, we suddenly tumble, as it were, into the elevator shaft of the *langue*. Most of us will quickly scramble back to the daylight of everyday language, while speculative, dreamy, obsessive minds may discover topoi they like to inhabit, ways to tinker with the general system, etc, becoming poets, entertainers, or psychotic street interventionists. They sense the power of these topoi; now the question is of skill to use them – skill and luck, nothing will work without both.

3. The man who saw himself mirrored in a cookie

Kuki Shûzô I think was one of these spirits; a whimsical but at the same time thorough interest for a wide range of topics, proficiency in a number of languages, a prolific user of specific, rich Kanji. His obsession with wordplay was notorious, going so far as to write essays about homophone readings of his own name – 九鬼 correctly meaning Nine Demons. Passing away too young after extensive studies in Europe and a few years of teaching at Kyoto University, he left as his main work 偶然性の問題, The Problem of Contingency.⁴ In it, Kuki lays out an array of different types of contingency that mirror the different types of necessity known to deductive logic. This appears as something like a reflection in a lake, and Kuki freely admits that it is not for us to

penetrate the surface: the subject of his reflection is largely the interface, the characteristic effects as which contingency appears to humans. »Contingency« may be, like »centrifugal force«, a fictional entity that yet seems descriptive for our interface, like »sun setting« though we know it is Earth that is orbiting. Focussing on this aspect of effect presents a challenge to serious discourse, which works with a rhetoric of ascribing »true« meaning and narrating »how it is« versus »how it seems«, and Kuki has been criticized for what he himself calls Metaphysics to clearly keep these observations apart from the scientific thought that he clearly commits to.⁵ He ultimately proposes a »primordial coincidence« out of which grows fate via the coincidentally occurring concatenations of necessary causal connections. This is the point which apparently has made him look dubious in relation to other thinkers. I think that this point remains speculative. But my way of reading Kuki may admittedly be refusing to take his key point seriously, as it has been well studied in the context of Kyôto School philosophy.

Like in the case of the stellar constellations, which are also obviously random patterns given names by observers building themselves mnemonic guidelines, contingency is an interface. Because it consists of the result of the myriad causal connections which are far too many for us to observe and compute, what appears as coincidence is the face of our finity, showing us the limits of our calculating power, as we jump to conclusions with, in the best case, a graceful kind of shame clothed in mythological excuses. Günther Anders and after him Hannes Bajohr speak of promethean shame⁶, a human inferiority complex in the face of the superior rationality of »our« machines. But it is not like mathematics ever *belonged* to us. It was discovered probably by gazing somewhat systematically at the sky while blood poured out of us in regular periods. – Unless something happened: The eros of the clinamen, the exception that shows the contours of the rule, the beginning of dialectics, the irregularity which appears as a fleshed-out mechanistic causality, or else a marvel or a monster. We notice it because it seems to be understandable and show itself to us as a potentially useful feature in our sense-making. Whether this

sense-making is a discovery of real connections or the construction of useful fictions remains largely open in most of our experimental explorations of experience.

Referring to Kuki's connection of puns and contingency, I propose a total turnaround of sense-giving: according to (my reading of) Kuki, it is the humble acceptance of the brain being too small to contain the world which potentially moves us deeply when considering coincidence. In Lacanian terms, it could be the death drive answering desire with an entropy-raising mirror that makes it scatter and attach to the world.

4. The bootstrapping hypothesis of Sound Symbolism

While puns in general are senseless, interlingual puns make this more obvious, because no etymology provides a semblance of historical causality. An interlingual pun may be made for the first time, and makes the punner feel *hiers*⁷ privilege-and-responsibility⁸, because what we do with words does shape reality, and in data-meagre places (such as the intersections of several language competencies), each incidence has more weight. Also, while jokes and puns generally work in a cultural field of humour, interlingual jokes step out into the open, uncharted waters of universal humour, probing it.

This use of newfangledness (Wyatt) is quite a turnaround in regard to the type of analysis that seeks causes in the past. Both diachronic resources for making sense of the present meet in their rootedness in synchronous structuralist linguistics.

Any theory of symbols defines a symbolic relationship to be one that is either contingent to or very far evolved from any possible resemblance. And yet the position labeled »Sound Symbolism« in linguistics is persistently associated with what are sarcastically labeled »bow-wow«-theories: the Romantic idea that language originated in onomatopoeia, and/or that onomatopoeia could play a more significant role than it is held to play in synchronistic theories of language and meaning. Karl Bühler gives a nice overview of how this distortion comes about in his *Theory of Language*.⁹ As Bühler points out, signs in languages are char-

acterized by their being situated in and necessarily working in relation to a field. For that reason already, any kind of relation between a sign and its object, be it mimetic, metaphoric, similar or following the classical Piercean threesome: iconic, indexical or symbolic, is not enough to make a symbol a symbol. Languages have a certain tolerance for mimetic features in their semantics, but in general, continual care must be taken to ensure the stable arbitrariness of language that shifts the focus of users toward the syntactic paradigm. Puns, onomatopoeia, poetic features and the like are strictly held as borderline and special uses of language, because their artful play might strengthen misleading kratylic¹⁰ ideas. According to Bühler, Herder and some of the early Romantic linguists were attuned to an etymological phantasy that imagined origins of language in mimesis. The Gestalt School for their part made good relations with structuralism impossible by using terms like supersummation, implying that something extra was generated in a whole, while unduly belittling parts. In reaction to these antirationalist movements, linguists and theorists of symbol, including Ernst Cassirer, developed the habit of staunchly overstating the marginality of mimetic features in language, taking on the policing task of the language themselves, as it seems. They needn't have been so scared of it. Mimesis is formally contingent even in overtly onomatopoeic words like cuckoo or cough. Language learners can rarely guess the meaning of onomatopoeia. No matter how illustrative a word is, its meaning as a word is defined by syntactic and semantic network relations, not by similarity of any kind. BUT: we perceive the shifting shadows on this level, and they entertain us and serve as landmarks. The one point in which I disagree a little bit with Bühler is his characterisation of onomatopoeia as strictly insular. Though it seems true for the direct onomatopoeia in Indoeuropean languages, as far as I can see, onomatopoeic features do also map somewhat systematically, which I do not find surprising. In Japanese it is common knowledge, e.g., that voiced aspirants tend to denote heaviness while non-voiced aspirants point to lightness or lack of friction; the range of dark to light vowels map corresponding concepts in words. Such mappings are taught to language learners as an aid

in their guesswork concerning onomatopoeia, whose conventionality remains, as mentioned, untouched.

Regarded in this way, Sound Symbolism is a set of mappings that are learned *from* a language, in conventionality, but are productive in inventing and interpreting neologisms by analogy, as well as in appreciating design that docks on to synaesthetic aspects of language. In learning additional languages, features of Sound Symbolism are interesting, but treacherous chaperones. In their article »The Sound Symbolism Bootstrapping Hypothesis«, Imai and Kita show just that.¹¹ They collect several studies of child development and defend the claim that Sound Symbolic hypotheses are used as a kind of stepping stone. As I mentioned above, as language users we know that language is conventional and strict, and yet we observe and play with, flirt with, as it were, the mappings, patterns and consistencies that we find in the physical forms of words and grammar. Children learning grammar have phases where they refuse to accept the exceptions to the patterns, which they have inferred by analogical reasoning. As we grow up in a language, such insults to our logic teach us to keep a certain distance from the patterns and beauties that structured our linguistic world as it was being built. Like in Japanese aesthetics, a break in a pattern points upward and outward to a larger-scale or higher-level pattern; one waits attentively with one's pattern recognition faculty for the regularity that will make sense of this irregularity. In this way exceptions point to the larger order of the cosmos.

But the attentiveness to these patterns and mappings, the willingness to read them even as symptoms or indices of something as yet unknown, does not just disappear, even though one knows that this is superstition, magic thinking. One might even say that aesthetics is a transferral of the pattern recognition faculty that is forbidden by the rational, disillusioned subject to practice its superstitious learning-fantasizing. These rampant forces are made productive as a social game in poetry, with rhyme and anaphoric patterning – a point that Bühler is particularly attentive to – and it would seem surprising, if it didn't provide a myriad of glitchy slides into the depths of childhood linguistic consciousness.

5. Material guidance

Bühler's term *material guidance*¹² seems apt to me because of its applicability in fields apart from language. In industrial design, the shape of parts is conceived to not only fulfill a function with maximal efficiency, but also to prevent confoundation. This concerns features that would be contingent to the functioning of a part, for example where exactly the holes for screwing are punched, or what color plastic a part is made of, but guide the assemblers resp. the users toward the right place or use of something. In the case of learning a new word, onomatopoetic hunches might in a similar way guide an intuited guess – but as mentioned before, this is treacherous due to the approximate infinity of thinkable similarities between sounds and concepts. Once learned, a trait conceivable as a similarity or metonymical connection can function as a mnemotechnical aid, an *Eselebrücke*. These traits however do structure a corpus. Words and concepts are aligned subconsciously along precisely these similarities, whether or not they have a plausible mimetic connection to their objects.¹³ This sometimes surfaces as a »folk etymology«, the etymologically false explanative narratives for words and names, often drawn from extinct languages.

Poetic obsessions, and psychoanalytic games based on them, extend into the future rather than into the past. As Kuki does with contingency, we can acknowledge the potency of the phonetic or visual features of words, their coincidences in homonyms, and their structural patterns, as effects – without assigning them any deeper truth or meaning. They may however be misused and given special meaning by obsessive users. This remains private, except for the rare – or not so very rare – cases of experimental or opportunistic terminology like Derrida's *différance* or Lacan's *sinthome*, psychomanipulative trademark and advertising coinages like Kleenex, or crossculturally amused slang like *Rajah*.¹⁴

6. Kuki Shûzô's Puns – Coincidence, Contingency, Problems

After the classification of logical types of contingency to match the logical types of necessity, Kuki Shûzô 九鬼周造's examples soon come to revolve around aesthetic effects of language and its

arrangement and selection in poetry. This concerns the physical form of words, the level of meaning, and that of plot design, touching upon what is also known as irony of fate¹⁵ and *amor fati*.¹⁶

In the article mentioned above, Kuki writes as a traveler of the heartwarming effect of a terrible pun made by a hairdresser in Paris: *Des Japonais sont déjà Ponys* (and therefore have no need of cavalry). I understand that the foreigner abroad is terribly lonely, but how can Kuki appreciate a joke that is so bad? Is it simply a spillover of pent-up love? I think there is something more, something explicitly perverse, in the »so bad it's good« sentiment, which will perhaps come in handy when recommending the total harmlessness of puns, as they not only do not foster positive beliefs, they are full of a consciousness of opposites, of negative meaning, of the world how it isn't. This is the hot point which I would like to explore here. What does Kuki mean exactly when he writes of this pun:

人を馬鹿にしているこの駄洒落は異郷の旅愁をかえって慰めてくれた。

Hito wo baka ni shiteiru kono dajare ha ikyou no ryoshuu wo kaette nagusametekureta. This pun, rather derogatory of people, had the inverse effect of comforting and amusing the lonely traveler.

One may be tired of literalness. Particularly someone living as a foreigner might be thirsty for poetic play, aesthetic sympathy, fine-tuned sense-making – even if it circles the empty centre of a pun. He may be missing the rougher play that requires a shared field and trusted, fully readable intersubjective relations. The politeness needed when working in a foreign language could be likened to the constraints of literalness, exchanging information or doing other things utilitarianistically considered worthy of the effort. The overflow of kindness of wanting to entertain another person, which also entails wishing for them to appreciate the effort by being genuinely entertained, particularly by things of no objective value, is a desire of the mind for intercourse, analogous to sexual desires. A foreigner continually confronted with clichés is, like an analyst, continually engaged in foiling projections of his

interlocutors, which is tiring. One longs to »pay with the body«. ¹⁷ Not only does one exchange interest, attention, sensibility; one crosses thirsts: it is a moment shared of admitting each of one's desire of the other, alignment and harmony. Indeed, the importance of this for displaced people is excruciatingly high.

Only for displaced people? Certainly not. But the dynamics can easily be inverted. Let us consider the opposite case as well. In places like Vienna (as a mixing pot of provincial and cosmopolitan traits), or in Kyoto, the atmospheric social pressure is strong. Groups of people are more or less compelled to set their sails according to the wind of the collective mood. One may return to these cities from travels abroad, and find that the years one has been away are instantly swallowed as one sinks in to one of those moments of collective *poiesis* that one has been missing so much. Years disappear without a trace, and one finds oneself, with a bit of surprise, in a complimentary kind of loneliness to that of being abroad: one is missing parts of oneself that one seems to have left in other countries. This country one has left and found one cannot return to might also simply be the past. In another scene presented in the same essay, Kuki refers also to this kind of loneliness. Upon entering a tea house with some friends, he asks for a biscuit and is asked by the girl serving whether that means a cookie. Triggered by the homonymy with his name, which he has overreflected in past writings, he laughs and makes a coquette joke, but something in his breast, he writes, goes »guk-ki«, a sharp pain, and with slight dizziness he comes to realize the distance between the old world that he inhabits and the new world the girl is living in, where the old word »biscuit« had been replaced by the newfangled »cookie«. ¹⁸

In both cases, the pun is an interface that at the same time connects and maintains distance. It is like a revolving door for desire to find an outlet in slapstick.

7. The Poetry of Random Violence

For a millisecond or a minute, depending on the kind of joke, many things one generally knows about the world seem lifted like a blanket to peek under. In this, the joke resembles the turning point of a swing or pendulum, when a number of forces in different

directions cancel each other out for a moment. This weightlessness is charming, and is also a sensitive point for decisions: if you would let go of the swing, you could fly onward rather than falling back into the pull of the (linguistic) ropes that brought you here. In certain jokes, this is called »Schrödinger's Douchebag«, and the joker reacts to the reaction of the listeners to which he attunes his attitude. In hilarity, thus, one collectively floats temporarily beyond the frameworks of sense-making. In most cases jokes are of course the function of art according to Hegel, the collective imaginary after Freud and Jung: a testing ground and a reservoir; sometimes an underground storage for beliefs or statements that are politically impossible to voice overtly – for whichever reason. But in this light, what should one make of the popularity of bad taste? The world of *Blondinenwitze*, where blondes are inconceivably stupid; closed worlds in which Jews or *Burgenländer* are commodified scapegoats, or the pointedly exaggerated brutality of Greek myths, *Märchen*, Punch and Judy, Pulcinella, the 3 Stooges. Why must there be so many murders? What exactly is not satisfied by a one-to-one realism without this sort of exaggeration and amplification?

It is not satisfactory to simply assume, in the Anglosaxon tradition of contractual ethics of mutual restraint of a natural egoism, that humans, exhausted from restraint and the pursuing the positive values, need a harmless vent for their dirtier passions. Such a modeling might actually lead people to organize their passions to construe such a base true self. But this still does not explain the scale of nastiness. In another model, the bad is logically necessary as the inversion of the good, not as the base that breaks through a static, construed, architecture-modeled good. Through the bottleneck of inversion, in the dynamics of projection, scale is not an issue, and we see more clearly the grammar, blown up. If we are, however we got here, in such a Jekyll and Hyde situation, wanting or trying (but maybe not really wanting) to identify with a good daytime self and actually identifying with the repressed in the role of evil twin, – it becomes necessary work to reintegrate this misleading polar identity construction. One needs to face oneself as one's own Doppelgänger, to integrate the ethical score counts in day-world and the underworld. Since narratives easily

fall back into habitual orders, what is most valuable is the swift, perhaps startling glance connecting the worlds, again and again, to get used to integrating both versions into one's concept of self. A technique of surprise like in Zen instruction: What better way to facilitate the transition than new connections that are not yet integrated to either the daytime nor the suppressed narrative. Puns in their meaninglessness guide the mind to notice the randomness of identity, the confoundability of things. A shared sound is nothing more than exactly that. It is a bridge that we are led over like a horse that is shy of bridges, spooked by the notion of passing between the categorically separated. The horse is led back and forth until it loses its spook, sewing together with experience, as it were, the two worlds.

The poetic beauty of puns lies in their meaninglessness, and this is also what affords their healing power as connectors via praxis rather than interpretation. A pun-guided analysis works out connections, separating them from their entailments or speculations of causality. In the moment of weightlessness of a direction change, the causality can painlessly shift from historical to final, helping me as a person to live the way I feel is right according to my current beliefs and goals, rather than what I feel compelled to do, trapped in sense networks I have inherited from my toxic heritage. Substitution, 転移, *Übertragung* is by such an account a real change, rather than something acceptable covering for something unacceptable.

But this is not merely arbitrary, because language is a collectively tended tool. Like archetypal narratives, punning depersonalizes. Puns can be shared because there is a certain plausibility, something less than arbitrariness in their incorrect non-truth. Sharing physical, at least: non-sensical connections as well as problems (like: what to do with this stupid joke) with others can be seen as the very water cycle¹⁹ of intersubjectively co-ordinated co-existence.

8. Un in Japanese

With these preambula, I'm afraid the data has grown cold, but here it is: The sound that is in discussion here as negative prefix in German, *un*, in Japanese, means yes.

It is (by contrast to the formal, obedient and emphatic *hai*) the casual affirmative signal that doesn't break the flow, but rather often acts as a kind of lubricant for the conversation, the phatic 相槌 *aizuchi* that provide the stream of welcoming feedback necessary for a speaker's words to flow out. It is also what the second demon of the two who guard the gates of temples says, an *o* to the *a* of the other, the first guardian.

Japanese is abundant in homophones. *Un* also means fortune, luck: 運がある – to be fortunate. And what might sound like child of luck, *un*ko, means faeces, but also calls to mind a timely movement, 運行 *unkô*: the regular movement of a tram or bus, or of the tides.

I see how one could start from here to consider absolute nothing as foundation of Being, following the Kyôto School's criticism of Heidegger, and revisit the discovery of Pessimism in European philosophy inspired by Asian thought, the mere notion of metempsychosis. But that is the path back into interpretation. Also, *Mu*, 無, is not *un*.

9. Stay on the ground and walk – Recapitulation

The sonar connection between these *uns*, the French *un* meaning one and the German *un-* meaning *non-* is completely arbitrary. It does not point to an etymological connection. Any speculations one might begin about a universal, non-bootstrapping theory of sound symbolism sink into the randomness of the sea of myriad interconnectedness. It is precisely in this sense that the similarity is refreshing. We can enjoy it in safety from over-interpretation, from interpretation at all. And perhaps this goes for our problems as well: when, thanks to a structural interpretation, they lose all heavy meaning by being suspended in the connectivity in their linguistic fields, becoming completely impersonal, that is the moment when we begin to be able to *read* them. Even if the ultimate comment, after reading, is a metaphysical grunt, a closing of the mouth in acceptance of what is: *Un*. —

- 1) Okonogi Keigo (小此木啓吾), *The Ajase Complex (by Kosawa): The theory of psychotherapy proposed by a Japanese psychoanalytic pioneer*, in: *Dynamische Psychiatrie* 8(5), 1975, pp. 296–307
- 2) There is something dangerously haphazard about creativity especially when practiced by someone educated in an individualist society. Ergonomics, by contrast, is concerned with the aptness of an invention for its users.
- 3) 九鬼周造：偶然の産んだ駄洒落、「九鬼周造随筆集」菅野昭正編、岩波文庫、岩波書店青空文庫(<http://www.aozora.gr.jp>) transl A.C.
- 4) 九鬼周造「偶然性の問題」東京岩波文庫 (Kuki Shūzō (2012), *Gūzensei no Mondai*, Tokyo 2012) An English translation of a shorter version written for a magazine is published in: Marra, Michael, *Japan's Frames of Meaning. A Hermeneutics Reader*, Honolulu 2011, p. 298–339
- 5) 運命と偶然との対立関係をあまりに力説することは運命をも偶然をも正当に理解することを妨げるものである。九鬼周造「偶然性の問題」東京：岩波2020 (4)、254頁 (Stressing too much the oppositional relation of fate and coincidence obstructs the correct understanding of both fate and coincidence. Transl. A. C.)
- 6) Anders, Günther, *Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen – Band I: Über die Seele in der zweiten industriellen Revolution*, München 2010 (1956) pp. 24, 69. Hannes Bajohr, perhaps considering Anders' own revision of his keyword, tones it down to Promethean Anxiety (I also would enjoy: unease). Bajohr, Hannes, *Algorithmic Empathy: Toward a Critique of Aesthetic AI*, in: *Configurations* 30(2), March 2022, pp. 203–231
- 7) This text uses *Polish Gendering*: the necessary letters for any gender are provided in such a way as to glitch or weld the genders.
- 8) *Kuleana*, the Hawaiian word, unites what is split into these two meanings in English, and is thus a keyword in the context of ecological stewardship in the current movement to reclaim a sustainable way of life here.
- 9) Bühler, Karl, *Sprachtheorie: Die Darstellungsfunktion der Sprache*, Jena 1934; Bühler, Karl, *Theory of Language. The Representational Function of Language*, transl. Donald Fraser Goodwin, Amsterdam, Philadelphia 1990; The book gives an account of language from a position spanning experimental psychology and linguistics. It has been paid little attention to apart from the extraction of his Organon-Model for use in introductory courses, perhaps due to its late translation into English.
- 10) Kratylc, referring to the Platonic dialogue *Kratyls*, is the naive theory of a language based on resemblance between words and their objects.

- 11) Imai M, Kita S., *The sound symbolism bootstrapping hypothesis for language acquisition and language evolution*, in: *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society*, 2014, B 369, pp. 1–13
- 12) Bühler, Karl, *Theory of Language – The Representational Function of Language*, transl. Donald Fraser Goodwin, Amsterdam, Philadelphia 1990, p. 194
- 13) (*) marks a concept which the author holds to be highly problematic, without entering the topic of its discussion.
- 14) probably from navigation communication »Roger«, intentionally conflated by speakers with the Philippine honorary title. Hawaiian Pidgin acknowledgement, similar in meaning to »Gotcha«.
- 15) Kierkegaard, Søren, *The Concept of Irony with continual reference to Socrates*, transl. Howard and Edna Hong, Princeton 1989
- 16) Nietzsche, Friedrich, *Fröhliche Wissenschaft*, Bd. IV, Aphorismus 276. Cf. Nishigami Kiyoshi, *Nietzsches Amor fati: Der Versuch einer Überwindung des europäischen Nihilismus*, Frankfurt a. M., Berlin 1993, S. 227; It comes in the context of a *tired* reading of Descartes' syllogism: the sigh of an addict, a thinker compelled to continue living because he is compelled to continue thinking. Amor fati comes as Nietzsche's New Years' resolution to stop fighting and to merely look aside when displeased. While *wegschauen*, looking away, scil. from problems, is generally criticized from an ethical perspective, in this context it shifts the focus from an active, accusative focus of a subject on an object, and recalls the myriad *other* things that always exist. *Amor fati* in this context also means a comparative appreciation of one's particular trajectory or fate, an aesthetic observer's view rather than a suffering or a controlling.
- 17) Moncayo, Raul, *The Signifier Pointing at the Moon – Psychoanalysis and Zen Buddhism*, London 2012, p. 228
- 18) 笑ったが、何かしら胸にグキッとした。ビスケットという古い言葉がクッキーという新しい言葉に代ってしまっているのを初めて知って、自分の住んでいる古い世界と少女の住んでいる新しい世界との間隔に軽い目まいを感じたのである。Waratta ga, nani kashira mune ni guki'to kanjita. bisuketto to iu furui kotoba ga kukki- to iu atarashii kotoba ni kawatteshimateiru no wo hajimete shite, jibun no sundeiru furui sekai to shoujo no sundeiru atarashii sekai no kankaku ni karui memai wo kanjita no dearu.
- 19) May here be referenced the suggestion, answering to the question of how to integrate ancestral ecological knowledge systems with modern academic practice, the water cycle has been recommended as an intentional metaphorical mapping in the context of Hawaiian studies, and I think it could well be adapted globally since we all drink water that comes from some situation. Kapā'anaokalaōkeola Nākoa Oliveira, Katrina-Ann R., *Ka Wai Ola: The Life-Sustaining Water of Kanaka Knowledge*, in: Kapā'anaokalaōkeola Nākoa Oliveira, Katrina-Ann R. and Kahunawaika'ala Wright, Erin (Edd.), *Kanaka 'Ōiwi Methodologies*, Honolulu 2016, pp. 72–85